Katherine Watier's Academics: Contemporary Epistemology

HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE COURSE EVALUATION

Name: Katherine Watier Year of entry: F94 Term: Fall 1997

Number and Title: CCS 322: Contemporary Epistemology

Instructor J. Hernandez Cruz

This course was an intensive introduction to the contemporary literature in analytic epistemology. Epistemologists seek answers to questions such as: When is it rational to have a particular belief? What is knowledge (as opposed to opinion)? In order to be justified in holding a belief, must someone know (or believe) that she is justified in holding that belief? These questions are asked within a framework where the overarching goal is attaining truth and avoiding falsity. Topics included Knowledge and Skepticism, Intemalism and Externalism, Foundationalism, Coherentism, Reliabilism, the Theory of Proper Functions, Naturalism, and Feminist Epistemology.

The syllabus was designed to prepare students concentrating in philosophy and related areas for graduate level work in the theory of knowledge. The class met weekly and was run in the style of a graduate seminar. Students were required to write papers for each meeting and were required to write a longer essay at the end of the course.

Ms. Watier's work in this class was extremely able. She was challenged by difficult material, and appeared to relish the opportunity to engage a literature that is far from her realm of expertise. In the end, Ms. Watier's work exhibited a clear and powerful understanding of central issues in contemporary epistemology. Ms. Watier is talented enough in philosophy to pursue it as a concentration, and her effort in this advanced seminar compared favorably with that of the student who claim philosophy as their central interest.

Weekly assignment

Ms. Watier's weekly papers improved dramatically over the course of the seminar. The early efforts were uneven. This was not surprising, as Ms. Watier was entering into an extraordinarily advanced philosophical dialogue. She worked hard on critically engaging the argumentation that is distinctive of the tradition in analytic philosophy. By the end of the course, her weekly papers were cogent and thoughtful. The changed seem to occur when Watier started to develop a view of her own that she defended from week to week. That view combines a sense that human cognition sets constraints on what beliefs are counted as justified, while maintaining that the set of psychologically or anthropologically justified beliefs might be quite small (and much smaller than is necessary, say, to sustain the rationality of science).

Participation

Ms. Watier's participation in class was adequate. To her considerable credit, she was not in the least intimidated by more mature philosophers in the seminar. Still, Ms. Watier would benefit

from an even higher degree of participation in the classroom. Her talent for thinking on her feet is considerable and deserves exercising.

Final Paper

Ms. Watier's "Human Innate Beliefs" attempts to combine insights from contemporary linguistic and cognitive science with more traditional issues in epistemology. In her paper she argues for a version of foundationalism in justification. Inherent, however, basic beliefs are basic in virtue of being either i) innate or ii) the product of an innate cognitive process. Watier takes the justification of such beliefs as primitive and non-inferential.

Along the way to arguing for her view, Watier explores the interaction between nativist theories and epistemology. That is, she considers the relationship between coherence and nativism, reliabilism and nativism, and Plantinga's theory of proper function and nativism. This discussion is nicely framed, and interacts with similar work by Stich and Curruthers. In addition, Watier introduces some elements of cognitive science research on nativism.

These issues are, of course, complicated. Ms. Watier does not quite spend enough time on her positive view. One issue that is vexed in the discussion is whether an innate belief has any virtue vis-a-vis truth. Waiter seems to waffle on this question: Sometimes, she says that a process would not have evolved if it were not reliable and thus truth-aimed. At other times, she seems satisfied that innate beliefs will satisfy internal constraints on rationality. We need a more nuanced discussion of internalism and externalism. It is never quite clear whether innate beliefs are supposed to be accessible to reflection (as the intemalist demands) or merely inside the agent (as, say, Pollock maintains).

In any event, Watier's work is an excellent effort broadly consistent with the trend toward naturalism in epistemology. Watier worked extremely hard in the course to very positive results.

1/2 DIV I CCS Yes





				HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE COURSE EVALUATION Name: Katherine Watier Year of entry: F94 Term: Fall 1997 Number and Title: CCS 322: Contemporary Epistemology Instructor J. Hernandez Cruz This course was an intensive introduction to the contemporary literature in analytic epistemology. Epistemologists seek answers to questions such as: When is it rational to have a particular belief? What is knowledge (as opposed to opinion)? In order to be justified in holding a belief, must someone know (or believe) that she is justified in holding that belief? These questions are asked within a framework where the overarching goal is attaining truth and avoiding falsity. Topics included Knowledge and Skepticism, Intemalism and Externalism, Foundationalism, Coherentism, Reliabilism, the Theory of Proper Functions, Naturalism, and Feminist Epistemology. The syllabus was designed to prepare students concentrating in philosophy and related areas for graduate level work in the theory of knowledge. The class met weekly and was run in the style of a graduate seminar. Students were required to write papers for each meeting and were required to write a longer essay at the end of the course. Ms. Watier's work in this class was extremely able. She was challenged by difficult material, and appeared to relish the opportunity to engage a literature that is far from her realm of expertise. In the end, Ms. Watier's work exhibited a clear and powerful understanding of central issues in contemporary epistemology. Ms. Watier is talented enough in philosophy to pursue it as a concentration, and her effort in this advanced seminar compared favorably with that of the student who claim philosophy as their central interest. Weekly assignment Ms. Watier's weekly papers improved dramatically over the course of the seminar. The early efforts were uneven. This was not surprising, as Ms. Watier was entering into an extraordinarily advanced philosophical dialogue. She worked hard on critically engaging the argumentation that is distinctive of the tradition in analytic philosophy. By the end of the course, her weekly papers were cogent and thoughtful. The changed seem to occur when Watier started to develop a view of her own that she defended from week to week. That view combines a sense that human cognition sets constraints on what beliefs are counted as justified, while maintaining that the set of psychologically or anthropologically justified beliefs might be quite small (and much smaller than is necessary, say, to sustain the rationality of science). Participation Ms. Watier's participation in class was adequate. To her considerable credit, she was not in the least intimidated by more mature philosophers in the seminar. Still, Ms. Watier would benefit from an even higher degree of participation in the classroom. Her talent for thinking on her feet is considerable and deserves exercising. Final Paper Ms. Watier's "Human Innate Beliefs" attempts to combine insights from contemporary linguistic and cognitive science with more traditional issues in epistemology. In her paper she argues for a version of foundationalism in justification. Inherent, however, basic beliefs are basic in virtue of being either i) innate or ii) the product of an innate cognitive process. Watier takes the justification of such beliefs as primitive and non-inferential. Along the way to arguing for her view, Watier explores the interaction between nativist theories and epistemology. That is, she considers the relationship between coherence and nativism, reliabilism and nativism, and Plantinga's theory of proper function and nativism. This discussion is nicely framed, and interacts with similar work by Stich and Curruthers. In addition, Watier introduces some elements of cognitive science research on nativism. These issues are, of course, complicated. Ms. Watier does not quite spend enough time on her positive view. One issue that is vexed in the discussion is whether an innate belief has any virtue vis-a-vis truth. Waiter seems to waffle on this question: Sometimes, she says that a process would not have evolved if it were not reliable and thus truth-aimed. At other times, she seems satisfied that innate beliefs will satisfy internal constraints on rationality. We need a more nuanced discussion of internalism and externalism. It is never quite clear whether innate beliefs are supposed to be accessible to reflection (as the intemalist demands) or merely inside the agent (as, say, Pollock maintains). In any event, Watier's work is an excellent effort broadly consistent with the trend toward naturalism in epistemology. Watier worked extremely hard in the course to very positive results. 1/2 DIV I CCS Yes
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